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Previous studies of the stock price response to trades focused on the dynamics of single stocks,
i.e. they addressed the self–response. We empirically investigate the price response of one stock to
the trades of other stocks in a correlated market, i.e. the cross–responses. How large is the impact
of one stock on others and vice versa? — This impact of trades on the price change across stocks
appears to be transient instead of permanent as we discuss from the viewpoint of market efficiency.
Furthermore, we compare the self–responses on different scales and the self– and cross–responses
on the same scale. We also find that the cross–correlation of the trade signs turns out to be a
short–memory process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The trading at stock exchanges is organized by the
order book whose main purpose is to provide the same
information to all market participants. Although often
ignored in the model building, it has a large impact on
the price dynamics and thus on the stylized facts as well
as on more specific features [1–9]. The stock price is de-
termined via a continuous double auction [10], in which
some traders submit market orders for immediate trans-
actions at the best available price, while other traders
submit limit orders which specify an acceptable price for
the trade. The limit orders are listed in the order book.
Most of them do not immediately lead to trades. The buy
limit orders are referred to as bids and the sell limit orders
as asks. The best ask and best bid prices are the quotes.
Market orders do not appear in the order book. When a
market order is executed, the quote can either stay un-
changed or the best ask (bid) price can go up (down) in
the case of a buy (sell) market order. The prices change
persistently as they are affected by the incoming market
orders. To profit from the price difference between ask
and bid, traders emit limit orders which leads to an anti–
persistence of prices. As a result of a detailed balance be-
tween persistent and anti–persistent, i.e., between super–
and subdiffusive behavior, the price on an intraday scale
moves diffusively like a random walk [11].
In recent years, a high auto–correlation of the order
flow was empirically found [11–14]. The splitting of or-
ders over longer times introduces long memory of the
order flow [13] with remarkable persistence. Buy (sell)
orders are often followed by more buy (sell) orders. Fur-
thermore, the relation between trades and price changes
has received considerable attention [2, 4, 11, 15–21]. The
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [22] states that all
available information is processed and encoded in the
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current price, which would rule out any (statistical) arbi-
trage opportunities. While this is in conflict with the very
different time scales on which, first, relevant new infor-
mation arrives and, second, the prices change, the model
of Zero Intelligence Trading (ZIT) [23] simply assumes
randomly acting trader, but also arrives at a memoryless
random walk.
In view of the EMH, there are two major approaches
to explain the impact of trades on the stock price change.
The first approach put forward by Lillo and Farmer
(LF) [12], suggests that the price impact is permanent,
but fluctuates with order size. The impact is caused
by an asymmetry in liquidity which is induced by the
trade. The self–response exhibits a power–law relation
between order size and price change [12, 24–26]. In the
second approach, Bouchaud, Gefen, Wyart and Potters
(BGPW) [11] argue that the price impact is transient,
but fixed with order size. The fact that the impact de-
cays with time is a result of price mean reversion. More-
over, they identify the relation between order size and
price self–response as logarithmic [27]. Gerig [28] sug-
gests that the two approaches LF and BGPW are equiv-
alent and can be related by exchanging variables. He
also argues that the impact comes from the asymmetric
liquidity rather than from the price mean reversion.
There are numerous studies devoted to the price re-
sponse, but they all focus on one single stock, i.e. on
the self–responses. Here, we go beyond this and investi-
gate the role of correlations. We carry out a large–scale
empirical study of real–time trade data and find a non–
vanishing price response across different stocks, i.e. for
the cross–responses. We shed light on the price impact
from trades in different stocks by discussing the efficiency
of the financial market. We thereby present a first com-
plete view of the response in the market as a whole and
identify several structural characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, we
present our data set of stocks, provide some basic def-
initions, and introduce two possible time scales for the
data analysis. We also test the accuracy of the trade
sign classification. In Sect. III, we show the empirical
2results, which demonstrate the existence of trade sign
cross–correlations and price cross–response, and we also
compare two possible definitions of the response func-
tions, in– or excluding the zero trade signs. In Sect. IV,
we present the market response structures and discuss the
trade impact on the prices in detail, especially from the
viewpoint of market efficiency. In Sect. V, we compare
the self–responses based on the two different time scales,
and we also compare the self– and cross–responses. We
give our conclusions in Sect. VI.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION AND TIME
CONVENTION
In Sect. II A, we present the data set that we use in
our analysis. In Sect. II B we discuss the proper choice
of time convention. In Sect. II C, we test the accuracy of
our trade sign classification.
A. Data set
Our study is based on the data from NASDAQ stock
market in the year 2008. NASDAQ is a purely electronic
stock exchange, whose Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data
set contains the time, price and volume. This informa-
tion is not only given for the trades with all successive
transactions, but also for the quotes with all successive
best buy and sell limit orders.
To investigate the response across different stocks in
Sect. III, we select six companies from three different
economic sectors traded in the NASDAQ stock market
in 2008. The stocks we analyzed are listed in Table I
together with their acronyms and the corresponding eco-
nomic sectors.
When studying the market response in Sect. IV, we
select the first ten stocks with the largest average market
capitalization in each economic sector of the S&P 500
index in 2008, except for the telecommunications services
where only nine stocks were available in that year. We
recall that the market capitalization is the trade price
multiplied with the traded volume, and the average is
performed over every trade during the year 2008. The
selected 99 stocks are listed in App. A.
TABLE I. Company information
Company Symbol Sector
Apple Inc. AAPL Information technology
Microsoft Corp. MSFT Information technology
Goldman Sachs Group GS Financials
JPMorgan Chase JPM Financials
Exxon Mobil Corp. XOM Energy
Chevron Corp. CVX Energy
We only consider the common trading days in which
the trading of stocks i and j took place, because the
trades of one stock i in one day would not impact the
intraday price of another stock j without any trade in
that day, and vice versa.
B. Physical versus trading time
While studies on the self–responses employ trading
time as time axis, this is not useful when studying the re-
sponse across different stocks, because each stock has its
own trading time. Hence, to study the cross–responses,
we better use the real, physical time. We project the
data set to a discrete time axis. The quote data and the
trade data of each stock are in two separate files with
a time–stamp accuracy of one second. However, more
than one quote or trade may be recorded in the same
second. Due to the one–second accuracy of the time–
stamps, it is not possible to match each trade with the
directly preceding quote. Hence, we cannot determine
the trade sign by comparing the traded price and the
preceding midpoint price. This latter definition of the
trade sign was employed by Lee and Ready [29]. Instead,
we here define the trade signs similarly to the tick rule of
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers [30]. They define the
trade as buyer–initiated (seller–initiated) if the trade is
carried out at a price above (below) the prior price. Zero
tick trades are not classified in general. The tick rule
has an accuracy of 52.8% [30]. For our study, we further
develop this method: as our data has a one–second accu-
racy in time, we consider the consecutive time intervals
of length one second. Let t label such an interval and
let N(t) be the number of trades in that interval. The
individual trades carried out in this interval are num-
bered n = 1, . . . , N(t) and the corresponding prices are
S(t;n). We define the sign of the price change between
consecutive trades as
ε(t;n) =


sgn
(
S(t;n) − S(t;n− 1)
)
,
if S(t;n) 6= S(t;n− 1),
ε(t;n− 1) , otherwise.
(1)
If two consecutive trades of the same trading direction
together did not exhaust all the available volume at the
best quote, the prices of both trades would be the same.
Thus, we set the trade sign equal to the previous trade
sign in this case. If there is more than one trade in the
interval denoted t, we average the corresponding trade
signs,
ε(t) =


sgn
(
N(t)∑
n=1
ε(t;n)
)
, if N(t) > 0 ,
0 , if N(t) = 0 ,
(2)
which formally also includes the case N(t) = 1. Conse-
quently ε(t) = +1 implies that the majority of trades in
second t was triggered by a market order to buy, and a
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FIG. 1. Comparison of different classifications for empirical and theoretical trade signs versus the physical time for AAPL
during one minute. (a) Sign comparison of every trade for AAPL on January 7th, 2008. (b) Sign comparisons of every second
for AAPL on January 7th, 2008 with the worst accuracy difference of 5% out of six samples. (c) The sign comparisons of every
second for AAPL on June 2nd, 2008. It shows a typical accuracy difference of 2%.
value ε(t) = −1 indicates a majority of sell market orders.
We have ε(t) = 0, whenever trading did not take place in
the time interval t or if there was a balance of buy and sell
market orders, i.e. if the argument of the sign function
vanishes, sgn(0) = 0. In order to avoid overnight effects
and any artifacts at the opening and closing of the mar-
ket, we consider only trades of the same day from 9:40:00
to 15:50:00 New York local time.
C. Accuracy of the trade sign classification
We test the accuracy of the trade sign classification
with the intraday data of AAPL, GS and XOM from
NASDAQ stock market by analyzing the TotalView–
ITCH data set [31], which provides the information in-
cluding buy or sell type, order price, and order volume
for each limit order with a unique order ID on the scale
of milliseconds. With this data set, we can identify the
trade directions (buy or sell) of the market orders, which
show opposite trade directions to the limit orders exe-
cuted simultaneously. For example, an executed sell limit
order corresponds to a buyer–initiated market order. The
executed prices and volumes of the market orders can
be obtained as well according to the information of the
executed limited orders. Here, we regard an execution
of one limit order as a transaction accompanied with a
market order in chronological order. Therefore, the trade
signs of the market orders inferred from the types (buy or
sell) of the executed limited orders are referred to as the
empirical trade signs, while the trade signs achieved by
comparing the prices between consecutive trades, as in
Eq. (1), are referred to as the theoretical trade signs. Al-
though the TotalView–ITCH data set indirectly provides
the empirical trade signs, it does not give the informa-
tion of the best quote and the trade as conveniently as
the TAQ data set. Thus, we only use the TotalView–
ITCH data set for testing the accuracy of the trade sign
classification.
In the TotalView–ITCH data set, the executed or-
ders can be classified as non–displayed orders and dis-
played limit orders in the order book. The executed
non–displayed orders correspond to the hidden trades
that we cannot use in our study for testing the accu-
racy of the trade sign classification. The executed limit
orders correspond to the trades identified as buyer– or
seller–initiated. We refer to these trades as to the identi-
fied trades. With these identified trades, we compare the
theoretical trade signs ε(t;n) with the empirical ones to
test the accuracy. For a given trade, we count the num-
ber of matches, i.e. the number of cases in which the
empirical and theoretical signs are the same. Thus, the
accuracy of the trade sign classification for a given trade
is defined as the number of matches divided by the total
number of identified trades.
We randomly select two trading days for each stock
in 2008. Due to high–frequency trading, there are more
than 10000 trades for each stock executed in each trading
day. As shown in Table II, the average accuracy of sign
4TABLE II. Accuracy of trade sign classification
Stock AAPL AAPL GS GS XOM XOM six samples
Date 20080107 20080602 20081007 20081210 20080211 20080804 (average)
For consecutive trades a
Number of identified limit orders 745020 407843 150532 199224 544451 596882
Number of identified trades 120287 52691 19942 17902 38455 59580
Number of matches 103635 47748 16668 15454 30478 49921
Accuracy of the classification 0.86 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.84 0.85
For trades with the stamp of one second a b
Total number of identified trade signs 17115 12180 8283 6853 8782 9590
Number of matches for Eq. (2) 13956 10636 6801 5784 6516 7777
Accuracy of the classification for Eq. (2) 0.82 0.87 0.82 0.84 0.74 0.81 0.82
Number of matches for Eq. (3) 13256 10302 6715 5690 6446 7603
Accuracy of the classification for Eq. (3) 0.77 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.73 0.79 0.80
Total number of ε(t) = 0 found empirically a
Using Eq. (2) 6000 10515 14218 15512 13719 12866 12138
Using Eq. (3) 5343 10186 14051 15426 13571 12731 11885
a The trading time in each day is set to 9:40:00 to 15:50:00 New York local time (total 22200 seconds).
b The case that ε(t) = 0 occurs simultaneously in three kinds of trade signs is excluded.
classification is equal to 85% for six tested samples. Fig. 1
(a) compares the two kinds of trade signs for AAPL dur-
ing one minute at Jan. 7th, 2008. The theoretical trade
signs nicely match with the empirical ones.
Furthermore, we test the trade sign ε(t) of every sec-
ond, defined as the sign of the number imbalance of
trades in one second as in Eq. (2). We use this definition
to calculate our theoretical trade sign in every second.
For the empirical trade sign in every second, we evaluate
the aggregated trade sign in two ways. We once more use
Eq. (2) and also employ the sign of the volume imbalance
of trades [18, 25, 26], as given by
ε(t) =


sgn
(
N(t)∑
n=1
ε(t;n)v(t;n)
)
, if N(t) > 0 ,
0 , if N(t) = 0 ,
(3)
where v(t;n) is the trading volume of n–th trade in sec-
ond t. If the volume imbalance, i.e. the argument of
the sign function, is a positive (negative) value, then
ε(t) = +1 (−1) implies buyer (seller)–initiated market
orders in t. If it is equal to zero, ε(t) = 0 indicates a
volume balance of buy and sell market orders. Moreover,
ε(t) = 0 also means that there was not any trade in t.
The total trading time in each trading day is 22200
seconds. In case that the accuracy of the sign classifi-
cation is influenced by an excess of zero trade signs, the
trading times in which ε(t) = 0 simultaneously occurs in
the three kinds of trade sign classification are excluded.
Thus, the remanent trading time is used to test the ac-
curacy of the classification of the trade signs ε(t). We
refer to this remanent trading time as to the identified
trading time. For each tested stock, there are more than
6000 seconds of identified trading time as shown in Ta-
ble II. That means there are more than 6000 identified
trade signs for each tested stock, since every second has a
trade sign. For each second, we compare the theoretical
trade sign with the empirical one. Again, we count the
number of matches. Thus, the accuracy of the trade sign
classification for every second is defined as the number
of matches divided by the total number of the identified
trade signs.
When the theoretical trade signs are compared with
the empirical trade signs aggregated according to Eq. (2),
the average accuracy of six tested samples in Table II is
82%. When the theoretical trade signs are compared with
the empirical ones aggregated according to Eq. (3), the
average accuracy is 80%. These two scenarios have an
accuracy difference of 2% only. That means the theoret-
ical trade signs defined by Eq. (2) have a high number of
matches with the empirical trade signs aggregated either
according to Eq. (2) or to Eq. (3). Moreover, the different
ways of aggregating trade signs do not strongly influence
the accuracy of the trade sign classification. Figs. 1 (b)
and (c) show the comparisons of three kinds of trade signs
for AAPL on the scale of one second. Compared to the
other five samples, AAPL at January 7th, 2008 in (b)
shows the worst accuracy difference of 5%. However, the
matches for three kinds of trade signs still can be found
most of the time. As a typical example, AAPL at June
2nd, 2008 in (c) shows the general case with the accuracy
difference of 2%, where the theoretical trade signs match
with the two kinds of aggregated empirical trade signs
rather well.
5TABLE III. Fit parameters and normalized χ2ij for the trade sign cross–correlators.
sign stock i stock j ϑij τ
(0)
ij [ s ] γij χ
2
ij (×10
−6)
correlators inc. 0 exc. 0 inc. 0 exc. 0 inc. 0 exc. 0 inc. 0 exc. 0
AAPL MSFT 0.46 0.05 0.05 3.46 1.00 1.35 0.23 1.52
MSFT AAPL 0.04 0.07 2.34 2.34 1.15 1.15 0.10 0.27
XOM CVX 0.61 0.67 0.06 0.21 1.04 1.16 0.07 0.52
cross GS JPM 0.45 0.48 0.07 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.18
AAPL GS 0.46 0.28 0.03 0.14 1.00 0.91 0.11 0.99
GS AAPL 0.49 0.49 0.06 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.13
GS XOM 0.61 0.73 0.04 0.08 1.04 1.10 0.04 0.20
XOM AAPL 0.76 0.29 0.05 0.34 1.09 1.42 0.12 0.18
AAPL AAPL 0.60 0.96 0.21 0.21 1.27 1.27 0.18 0.50
self GS GS 0.54 0.71 0.12 0.25 1.17 1.18 0.04 0.44
XOM XOM 0.54 0.89 0.17 0.23 1.12 1.14 0.09 0.49
III. CROSS–RESPONSES FOR PAIRS OF
STOCKS
To study the mutual dependences between stocks,
we consider pairs of two different stocks. We intro-
duce the cross–response function as well as a trade sign
cross–correlator for such stock pairs in Sect. III A and
Sect. III B, respectively. It turns out that the in– or ex-
clusion of the trade signs ε(t) = 0 make a difference. We
compare these two possible definitions in Sect. III C. In
the sequel, all quantities referring to a particular stock
carry its index i, quantities referring to a pair carry two
such indices. We consider eight pairs of stocks listed in
Table I, four within the same economic sector, four across
different economic sectors.
A. Cross–response functions
To measure how a buy or sell order of stock with index
j at time t influences the prices of the stock i at a later
time t+ τ , we introduce the cross–response function. We
employ the logarithmic price differences or log–returns
for stock i and time lag τ , defined via the midpoint prices
mi(t),
ri(t, τ) = logmi(t+τ)−logmi(t) = log
mi(t+ τ)
mi(t)
(4)
at a given time t, keeping in mind the one–second ac-
curacy. To acquire statistical significance, the cross–
response function is the time average
Rij(τ) =
〈
ri(t, τ)εj(t)
〉
t
(5)
of the product of time–lagged returns and trade signs for
stocks i and j, respectively. Two definitions are possible
and meaningful: one can in– or exclude the trade signs
εj(t) = 0. This does make a difference as it affects the
normalization: The total number of events that deter-
mines the normalization constant for the average is larger
when including the events with εj(t) = 0, although they
yield contributions ri(t, τ)εj(t) = 0. We further discuss
this issue in Sect. III C. Here, we begin with present-
ing our empirical results for different stock pairs (i, j) in
Figs. 2 and 3 versus the time lag, for in– and excluding
trade signs εj(t) = 0, respectively. In all cases, an in-
crease to a maximum is followed by a decrease, i.e. the
trend in the cross–response is eventually reversed.
This trend does not depend on whether or not the pairs
are in the same economic sector or extend over two sec-
tors. The stocks face similar systematic risks, leading
to stronger cross–response in the same sector than across
different sectors. However, strong cross–responses for the
stock pairs from different sectors also exist, e.g. for (GS,
AAPL). Apart from reasons specific for the stock pair
considered, this might also be related to how investors
assemble their portfolios. To disperse the investment
risks, the portfolios often comprise stocks from differ-
ent sectors since they are exposed to different economic
risks and are less correlated than stocks within the same
sector. When investors buy or sell the stocks in their
portfolios gradually, it may produce cross–responses and
sign cross–correlations in different stocks. We measure
the strength of the sign cross–correlation in Sect. III B.
The price reversion is also independent of in– or ex-
cluding zero trade signs εj(t) = 0. The cross–response
including εj(t) = 0 measures the remanent price impact
of market orders of stock j taking into account the cases
in which trading did not occur, while the cross–response
excluding εj(t) = 0 purely measures the price impact of
market orders ignoring the lack of trading. The difference
of both cross–response functions is mainly in the overall
amplitude, but the general trends for each stock pair are
quite similar. More details will be given in Sect. III C.
As we quantify the price impact to every second, the
non–zero value of Rij(1) represents the one–second im-
pact of trades between different stocks. It is rather differ-
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FIG. 2. Cross–response functions Rij(τ ) including εj(t) = 0 in 2008 versus time lag τ on a logarithmic scale (top panels).
Corresponding trade sign cross–correlators Θij(τ ) for different stock pairs on a doubly logarithmic scale, fit as dotted lines
(bottom panels). The stock pairs in the first column of panels are from the same economic sectors, and in second column of
panels are from the different economic sectors. The third column of panels are the self–responses and sign self–correlators to
be compared with cross–responses and sign cross–correlators.
R
ij
(τ
)
×10 -5
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
τ/s
100 101 102
Θ
ij
(τ
)
10 -6
10 -5
10 -4
10 -3
10 -2
10 -1
100
i=AAPL, j=MSFT
i=MSFT, j=AAPL
i=XOM, j=CVX
i=GS, j=JPM
τ/s
100 101 102 103
i=AAPL, j=GS
i=GS, j=AAPL
i=GS, j=XOM
i=XOM, j=AAPL
×10 -4
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
τ/s
100 101 102 103
10 -6
10 -5
10 -4
10 -3
10 -2
10 -1
100
i=AAPL, j=AAPL
i=GS, j=GS
i=XOM, j=XOM
FIG. 3. Cross–response functions Rij(τ ) excluding εj(t) = 0 in 2008 versus time lag τ on a logarithmic scale (top panels).
Corresponding trade sign cross–correlators Θij(τ ) for different stock pairs on a doubly logarithmic scale, fit as black dotted
lines (bottom panels). The stock pairs in the first column of panels are from the same economic sectors, and in second column
of panels are from the different economic sectors. The third column of panels are the self–responses and sign self–correlators
to be compared with cross–responses and sign cross–correlators.
7ent from the instantaneous impact in single stocks, as the
trades in our study do not consume the volumes in order
book of impacted stocks to shift the price directly. The
price impact between stocks may come from other mech-
anisms, such as trading information transmission, which
affects the limit orders of impacted stocks placed or can-
celled, or even from market orders executed to move the
price indirectly. This is possible due to high frequency
trading, which leads to trades executed at the level of
milliseconds. Thus, the time interval of one second is
sufficient to identify trading information transmission or
other mechanisms.
It is worth mentioning that Figs. 2 and 3 show an in-
crease of the cross–response after decreasing back at large
time lag τ close to 1000 s. We attribute this to the re-
sponse noise, quantified in App. C.
B. Trade sign cross–correlator
The existence of sign self–correlations is the main rea-
son that causes the self–response [11]. For pairs of stocks,
we introduce the trade sign cross–correlator
Θij(τ) =
〈
εi(t+ τ)εj(t)
〉
t
(6)
as a function of the time lag τ . To study how the in– or
exclusion of εj(t) = 0 impacts cross–correlations of trade
signs, we also distinguish the two possible definitions.
However, it turns out that the differences are negligible.
The sum of the product of trade signs between stocks
is not changed. What changes is the total number of
trades, which enlarges or shrinks the average value. As
seen in Figs. 2 and 3, the inclusion of εj(t) = 0 actually
decreases the sign cross–correlation instead of increasing.
As we demonstrate in Figs. 2 and 3, there is a non–zero
correlation across stocks. It turns out that the empirical
result can be fitted well by the power law
Θij(τ) =
ϑij(
1 + (τ/τ
(0)
ij )
2
)γij/2 . (7)
To estimate the error, we use the normalized χ2ij , see
App. B. The parameters for the best fit as well as the
χ2ij values for the analyzed eight stock pairs are listed in
Table III. In contrast to the sign self–correlation on the
trading time scale [11, 12], most of the stock pair cross–
correlations on the physical scale exhibit short mem-
ory with exponents γij ≥ 1 rather than long memory.
The latter usually is defined as corresponding to expo-
nents smaller than unity [32]. This indicates that the
price change of one stock responding to the trades of an-
other stock only persists for shorter times, and the cross–
response reverses at relatively small time lags τ . When
comparing the sign cross–correlator including εj(t) = 0
with the one excluding εj(t) = 0, it is instructive to look
at the parameter τ
(0)
ij , which measures the decay period
of sign cross–correlation. For most of the stock pairs,
the sign cross–correlation excluding εj(t) = 0 shows a
longer decay period than that including εj(t) = 0. This
illustrates that the lack of trading or the balance of buy
and sell market orders accelerates the decay of the sign
cross–correlations.
In addition, we notice the large fluctuations of the
trade sign cross–correlator at larger lags τ . They are
partly due to the decrease of the response signal, but
also to the limited statistics. The larger the time lag τ ,
the larger is the overlap of the lag τ for different times
t. When averaging the sign cross–correlation over every
second t for large τ , the result has poor statistics.
C. Including or excluding zero trade signs
Previous studies [11, 12, 14, 28] focus on the self–
response or sign self–correlation. The time used is event,
i.e. trade based rather than physical. Thus, only buy or
sell market orders are considered. In contrast, our study
uses the physical time scale meaning that the price im-
pact is quantified to every second, no matter if there was
a trade or not. This is necessary or even inevitable as we
study cross–responses for trades of different stocks which
never are synchronous. For the self–response, one trade
can cause the change of the volumes in the order book,
leading to further price changes. However, for the cross–
response, one trade from a different stock cannot change
the price of the impacted stock directly by consuming the
volumes of the limit orders in the order book. The ne-
cessity to use the physical time forces us to deal with the
case ε(t) = 0 if a trade does not occur in a given second t.
The corresponding information can be found in Table II,
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where, on average, more than half of the total physical
time for each trading day features zero trade signs.
There are two alternative choices for the sign at t with-
out any trade. One considers ε(t) = 0, such that the price
at t is not affected. After averaging the response over the
entire time, the influence of lack of trades is included in
the response function. If the average is restricted to the
time in which trading took place, the influence of the lack
of trading is obviously excluded. In our opinion, the fact
that there was a trade or not cannot be treated as neg-
ligible feature of the order book. It contains important
information on the trading activity, reflecting that the
traders have not traded for some time for whatever eco-
nomic or other reason. We thus believe that to only con-
sider the impact from successive trades no matter how
long the time without trading is between them on the
physical time scale might introduce a misleading bias.
Many values of ε(t) = 0 can be found in each trading
day, see Table II.
Alternatively, we can simply keep the trade sign until
the next trade occurs. This means that, if a trade did not
take place, the last trade continues to have an unaltered
impact until the next trade is executed. The correspond-
ing picture is reminiscent of Fig. 1 (a). This alternative
choice implies that the trade sign which is fixed in the
above way at second t is independent of the length of the
time τ0 without trading. Empirically, however, the trade
sign is more likely to reverse after a time τ0 without trad-
ing. We demonstrate this for AAPL in Fig. 4 which dis-
plays the probability densities ps(τ0) and pd(τ0) for find-
ing the same or different trade signs, respectively, after
τ0. By definition, we have ps(τ0)+pd(τ0) = 1. We notice
that, as the time without trading evolves, the probabil-
ity density for finding the same sign decreases, while the
probability for a sign reversal increases. Thus, the longer
the time without trading, the weaker is the impact of
the last trade. Obviously, the second choice introduces
a bias. Hence, we stick to the first choice, because the
response including ε(t) = 0 properly relates to the decay-
ing impact, while the response excluding ε(t) = 0 yields
results similar to using trading time instead of physical
time.
Furthermore, we emphasize that ε(t) = 0 can have
two reasons: either lack of trading or a balance of buy
and sell market orders in t. In the latter case, al-
though the trade directions of buy and sell market or-
ders in one second annihilate each other, we cannot say
whether or not the trading itself, regardless of the direc-
tion, causes a cross–response of another stock. If so, does
it weaken or strengthen the total cross–response? — To
be more quantitative, we introduce the cross–responses
R
(inc. 0)
ij (τ) and R
(exc. 0)
ij (τ) in– and excluding ε(t) = 0,
respectively. Here, we do not distinguish the two reasons
for ε(t) = 0. Hence, in a formal manner, the cross–
response for ε(t) = 0 can be quantified as the difference
of these two kinds of cross–responses,
R
(only 0)
ij (τ) = R
(inc. 0)
ij (τ)−R
(exc. 0)
ij (τ). (8)
Similarly, the sign cross–correlator for ε(t) = 0 is given
by
Θ
(only 0)
ij (τ) = Θ
(inc. 0)
ij (τ) −Θ
(exc. 0)
ij (τ). (9)
From this formal viewpoint, the cross–response for ε(t) =
0, i.e. the price change conditioned on not trading or a
balance of buy and sell market orders has a non–zero
value. As shown in Fig. 5, both the cross–response and
sign cross–correlator for ε(t) = 0 have negative values. In
other words, the existence of the events ε(t) = 0 weakens
the cross–response that is purely due to trades. Eliminat-
ing the influence of ε(t) = 0 enlarges the impact of trades
on the price change. In this sense, the cross–response
including ε(t) = 0 is a conservative estimation of the
price impact. Moreover, the price change conditioned on
ε(t) = 0 shows a similar trend as the price change con-
ditioned on trades, i.e., it reverses at large lags. This
discussion strongly corroborates our procedure of analy-
sis by including ε(t) = 0.
In the sequel, to avoid cumbersome phrases, we will
use the term lack of trading for both reasons that give
ε(t) = 0, i.e., including the balance of buy and sell mar-
ket orders. We will always show the responses in– and
excluding zero trade signs for comparison.
9IV. MARKET RESPONSE
We explore the market response structures by normal-
ized response matrices with and without zero trade signs
in Sect. IVA. Studying the market as a whole, we discuss
the market impact of trades in Sect. IVB before we turn
to the transient impact from the perspective of market
efficiency in Sect. IVC.
A. Market response structure
The cross–response functions and the trade sign cross–
correlators we considered up to now give us a kind of mi-
croscopic information for stock pairs. It is equally impor-
tant to investigate how the trading of individual stocks
influences the market as a whole. In a first step, we tackle
this question by introducing the market response as the
matrix ρ(τ) whose entries are the normalized response
functions at a given time lag,
ρij(τ) =
Rij(τ)
max (|Rij(τ)|)
, (10)
where the denominator is the maximum over all stock
pairs (i, j) for fixed τ . The diagonal elements are the self–
responses, and the off–diagonal elements are the cross–
responses. The matrix ρ(τ) is reminiscent of, but should
not be mixed up with a matrix of Pearson correlation
coefficients. Importantly, the matrix of the market re-
sponse is not symmetric, ρij(τ) 6= ρji(τ), as two different
quantities, the returns and the trade signs, enter the defi-
nition Eq. (5). Furthermore, the market response reveals
information about the time evolution.
Our empirical analysis is depicted in Fig. 6 for a mar-
ket with 99 stocks, see App. A. We show the 99 × 99
matrices of the market response for different time lags
τ = 1, 2, 60, 300, 1800, 7200 s in the year 2008. The di-
agonal strip is simply the self–response. In general, the
price change of one stock is always affected by the trad-
ing of all others, and vice versa. The stocks are ordered
according to the economic sectors.
Although the responses both for εj(t) = 0 in– and
excluded show similar trends of price reversion, they ex-
hibit quite different market microstructures in each sec-
ond as shown in Fig. 6. This is particularly noticeable
when the stocks act as the impacting stocks j. As some
stocks yield stronger impacts than others, the matrix fea-
tures striking patterns of strips with the cross–responses
including εj(t) = 0. They are associated with the cor-
responding sectors. For example, the information tech-
nology (IT) sector produces a visibly strong strip over
almost all other sectors. This effect is quite stable over
time. In contrast, strips cannot be found in the matrix
of the cross–responses excluding εj(t) = 0. The whole
market displays a relatively homogeneous distribution of
the response across the impacting stocks.
Furthermore, for εj(t) = 0 either in– or excluded, it
is worth mentioning that the responses vary from sector
to sector. For example, utilities (U), financials (F) and
energy (E) respond to their own sectors with different
strengths. Looking at the same sector, there is some
difference as well. For example, the utilities (U) sector
at τ = 60 has a weak response for εj(t) = 0 included,
but a relatively strong response for εj(t) = 0 excluded.
In other words, there is a price impact purely caused by
the trades of the utilities (U), but due to the long non–
trading time for the stocks in utilities (U), the impact is
considerably weakened.
The market response structures in– and excluding zero
trade signs contain different information. The response
including εj(t) = 0 greatly depends on the impacting
stocks j. In contrast, there is not an obvious difference
of impacts purely caused by trades across the impacting
stocks j when excluding εj(t) = 0. Thus, lack of trading
appears as largely influencing the impact of trades when
looking at the responses.
B. Transient market impact
For individual stocks, the price impact has a transient
and a permanent part [30]. When a trade is executed, the
price of an individual stock is impacted and reaches a new
instantaneous price. As time evolves, the instantaneous
price tends to revert to the initial price, but forming a fi-
nal price which may be different from the initial one. The
difference between the instantaneous price and the final
price is referred to as the transient impact of a trade. The
transient impact can be attributed to the price mean re-
version when the order size is fixed [11]. The price mean
reversion can be regarded as a result of a game between
liquidity takers and liquidity providers. The liquidity
takers split their orders to conceal the trading informa-
tion, leading to a long–memory self–correlations in the
trade signs. Meanwhile, to keep their price at an ap-
propriate position, the liquidity providers try to slowly
mean revert the price. The difference between the final
price and the initial price is referred to as the permanent
impact of a trade. The permanent impact, which is due
to the asymmetric liquidity, can be identified through a
power–law between order size and price change [12, 24–
26, 28].
In our study, it is difficult to identify whether a per-
manent impact exists or not, but the price reversion with
time lag in Figs. 2 and 3 as well as the evolution of the
market response structure in Fig. 6 manifest the exis-
tence of a transient impact between stocks. As stated in
Sect. III, the trade of one stock cannot lower the volume
in the order book and thereby change the price of another
stock directly. Thus, there must be other mechanisms to
explain the transient impact between stocks.
Although we cannot fully support the following state-
ments by sufficient evidence, we wish to discuss some pos-
sible reasons for a transient impact. We thereby partly
transfer a line of reasoning put forward in the case of
self–responses [14] to our case of cross–responses. One
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FIG. 6. Matrices of market response with entries ρij(τ ) for i, j = 1, . . . , 99 at different time lags τ = 1, 2, 60, 300, 1800, 7200 s
in the year 2008. The stocks pairs (i, j) belong to the sectors industrials (I), health care (HC), consumer discretionary (CD),
information technology (IT), utilities (U), financials (F), materials (M), energy (E), consumer staples (CS), and telecommuni-
cations services (TS). The responses in the first two columns of panels include εj(t) = 0, while in the last two columns εj(t) = 0
is excluded.
possible reason might be related to the order splitting.
Suppose each stock has trade sign self–correlations, it
can happen that a sequence of positive trade signs, say,
in one stock partly overlaps on the physical time axis
with a sequence of positive trade signs in the other stock.
Such a situation can occur due to true economic corre-
lations which are then also reflected in the return time
series, or it can be purely coincidental. In any case, a
cross–correlation of trade signs may result and lead to a
cross–response of one stock to the trades of another stock.
As the impact of trades in the self–responses is transient,
the impact in cross–responses indirectly caused by sign
self–correlations should be transient as well. Another
possible reason might be rooted in the behavior of the
traders. The overreaction to a trading information, e.g.
herding behavior, prompts traders to extend their activ-
ities to other stocks which they did not trade previously.
This might also lead to price changes of those stocks.
When the traders calm down and take up again their
previous trading patterns, the price of those stocks will
be less impacted. Here, the traders act as distributors
for the trading information regarding different stocks.
C. Restoring market efficiency
Importantly, the transient impact relates to the mar-
ket efficiency. According to the Efficient Market Hypoth-
esis (EMH) [22], the price encodes all available informa-
tion, implying that arbitrage opportunities do not ex-
ist. Thus, the response functions measuring the price
changes caused by trades should be zero, either for one
single stock or across different stocks. However, the
empirical analysis already demonstrated non–zero self–
response [11]. Likewise, non–zero cross–responses are
seen in Fig. 6. The market response is mainly positive up
to time lags of about τ = 7200 s, while negative responses
show up later. The existence of both, the empirical self–
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FIG. 7. Doubly averaged response functions R(τ ) in– and
excluding εj(t) = 0 for the whole market in 2008 versus time
lag τ on a logarithmic scale. The error bars indicate the
standard errors. For better comparison, the doubly average
response function for εj(t) = 0 included and its error bars are
scaled up by a factor of six.
and cross–responses, might seem to be in conflict with
the EMH. However, the presence of informed trades is
hardly detected for single stocks [11] and the impact
of trades on the price is more likely to be due to the
trading costs. Although the transient impact of trades
across stocks cannot be directly traced back to the liquid-
ity costs, we are hesitating to attribute it to a violation of
the EMH. We recall that the liquidity costs, measured by
the bid–ask spread, are the costs for making transactions
without time delay [33, 34]. The trading costs include
the brokerage commission and the costs resulting from
the bid–ask spread, where the brokerage commission is
fixed during the transaction.
Another possible explanation for the findings in Fig. 6
is that market efficiency is violated on short time scales,
but always restored on longer time scales. As discussed
in Ref. [11], the behavior of some traders will alert other
traders. In this process, it is not important whether or
not the trading is driven by valid information. The net ef-
fect is that the alerted traders act similar to arbitrageurs
reverting the price until a state compatible with the EMH
is reached. This process takes some time. Clear evidence
for this interpretation is provided by the following analy-
sis. All information is incorporated into the market as a
whole, not only into the currently traded stocks, but also
to the currently not traded ones. As argued in Sect. III,
the cross–responses fluctuate at large time lags due to a
noise effect. For the whole market, these fluctuations are
washed out by a self–averaging process amounting to
R(τ) = 〈〈Rij(τ)〉j〉i , (11)
where i = j is excluded. Thus, the information about
price changes becomes statistically much more signifi-
cant. The doubly averaged response functions (11) are
displayed in Fig. 7. The price trend is caused by a small
part of potentially informed traders: first R(τ) increases,
then it decreases because of the reverting actions of the
alerted traders. The decay of the average response for the
whole market takes longer time than for one stock pair.
This is partly a result of the noise reduction. Moreover
it might indicate that the whole market needs more time
to respond to all potential information than one individ-
ual stock. With time scales of about three hours, the
restoration of efficiency for the whole market is a rather
slow process. When the market moves back to an efficient
state, the impact of trades between stocks vanishes. In
this sense, the impact is transient instead of permanent
both for the lack of trading in– and excluded in the anal-
ysis.
Generalizing the analysis of Ref. [11] for the individ-
ual stocks, we evaluate the evidence for the presence of
informed trades across stocks by working out the proba-
bility distribution of the signed return
uij(τ) = ri(t, τ)εj(t) (12)
for the whole market in 2008, here without εj(t) = 0.
The resluts are displayed in Fig. 8. The distribution of
positive and negative signed returns at τ = 30 s is asym-
metric, but can be symmetrized by a shift of ∆uij(τ) =
5×10−5. Nevertheless, for large signed returns, the asym-
metry prevails. The value of ∆uij(τ) = 5 × 10
−5 has to
be compared with a value of about R(30) ∼ 7 × 10−5
for the doubly averaged response function. As the cross–
response is the average of the signed returns, the price
impact can be related to at least two causes. We find
it plausible to carry over the line of reasoning for indi-
vidual stocks in Ref. [4] to our analysis across stocks: a
shift reveals the uninformed trades while an asymmetry
on longer scales hints at the presence of informed trades.
V. COMPARISONS OF SELF– AND
CROSS–RESPONSES
We now compare the self–responses and the sign
self–correlators for trading and physical time scales in
Sect. VA as well as the self– and cross–responses and sign
cross–correlators on the physical time scale in Sect. VB.
A. Comparisons of self–responses on trading and
physical time scales
As seen in Table III, the sign self–correlators on the
physical time scale exhibit short memory no matter
whether zero trade signs are in– or excluded. This is
very different from the sign self–correlators on the trad-
ing time scale [11, 12] which have a long memory. The
difference originates from the time scales used. The trad-
ing time scale regards one trade as a stamp, such that
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the trade sign only represents a buy or sell market or-
der at each event stamp. The long memory of sign self–
correlations caused by fragmented orders is thus easily
captured even over several days. From the perspective
of intraday trading, however, the trading time scale loses
sight of the time between two successive trades, such that
two events might have occurred within one second or sep-
arated by several hours. It is thus difficult to estimate
the price impact for intraday trading. To overcome this
problem, the physical time scale quantifies the price im-
pact for a time interval of given length, e.g. one second.
The aggregated trade sign for this interval indicates an
imbalance of buy and sell market orders instead of an
individual buy or sell market order. Therefore, it gives
limited information on the influence of multiple market
orders with the same trade direction in the time inter-
val of one second, but magnifies the effect due to only
one market order with the opposite direction in another
second. Hence, the long memory of sign self–correlations
caused by fragmented orders is either suppressed within
the one–second interval or influenced by random trades in
other one–second intervals, leading to the short memory
of the sign self–correlators on the physical time scale.
The value of the self–response function for τ = 1 s,
i.e. Rii(1), has to be interpreted differently on the two
time scales. On the trading time scale, Rii(1) reflects the
instantaneous impact of one trade, since a market order
might not only consume the volumes in the best quotes
but also the ones in the second or third best quotes to
shift the price instantaneously. The price impact is not
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likely to come from the informed trades, it rather is due to
the trading costs [11]. In other words, the instantaneous
impact is due to the liquidity costs on the trading time
scale. However, Rii(1) on the physical time scale is the
average impact of one second regardless of the number
of trades. This impact has two causes, the uninformed
trades for all lags, e.g. liquidity costs, and the informed
trades for small lags, as shown in Fig. 9.
Figure 9 displays the probability distribution of signed
returns on the physical time scale with different time
lags for AAPL in 2008, excluding the zero trade signs.
The parts of the distributions for negative arguments are
folded back to the positive region. There is an overall
shift of the distribution from the vertical axis correspond-
ing to zero signed returns. For the different time lags, the
value of the shift are rather stable, and likely to stem from
the uninformed trades. When we shift the whole distri-
butions by ∆uij(τ) = 5.15×10
−5 with τ =1, 15, 120, and
300 s, respectively, and then fold the negative parts of the
distributions back to the positive region, we still find a
difference between the two parts of the distribution, es-
pecially for those with small lags. The asymmetric tail
of the distribution reflecting the imbalance of the buy
and sell orders is related to the presence of the informed
trades. It is only visible for small time lags, but disap-
pears for larger ones, for example, the two parts of the
distribution for τ = 300 s are indistinguishable. Hence
the price impact in this case only stems from the unin-
formed trades. The informed trades can be attributed to
the insufficient liquidity on short time intervals. When
the liquidity is restored by submitting more limit orders,
the informed trades disappear, but the remaining impact
from the uninformed trades stays unchanged, indicating a
possible coverage of the trading costs. Some sharp bends
due to the shifting procedure can be seen for the distri-
butions in the inset of Fig. 9 (right hand side) at very
small signed returns.
B. Comparisons of self– and cross–responses on
the physical time scale
On the physical time scale, the trade signs at time t
for both, the self– and cross–responses, are aggregated,
which produce some similar features. Obviously, Rii(1)
and Rij(1) both represent the impact of everything what
happened in the first one second interval. Moreover, both
the self– and cross–responses contain uninformed and in-
formed trades for all or small lags, respectively, as seen
by comparing Fig. 8 with Fig. 9.
However, the impacting stock is also impacted in the
self–response, but this is not so in the cross–response,
implying that there are different modes of impact. As
already discussed, for the self–response, the market or-
ders in one second move the price by removing volume
of the limit orders from the order book. The therefore
insufficient liquidity on short time intervals will trigger
actions by the traders, affecting the placement or can-
cellation of limit orders or even the execution of market
orders. For the cross–response, on the other hand, trades
of one stock that move the price of another stock do not
directly affect the volumes of the latter stock in the or-
der book. The impact across different stocks is likely
to occur through the spread of information about the
trading that influences the traders’ actions. The impact
due to consuming volumes is stronger than that due to
the information spread, as there also is competing infor-
mation, e.g. about other trades, or relevant incoming
news. Thus, the self–responses is mostly stronger than
the cross–responses, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
Connected to the self– and cross–responses, the sign
self– as well as cross–correlations have short memory. Re-
gardless of the effects due to effectively random trading,
the sign self–correlation can mainly be attributed to the
order splitting, just like the sign self–correlation on the
trading time scale. However, the sign cross–correlations
may have multiple causes. One is the herding behavior.
Some traders follow others when deciding to buy or sell
specific stocks, but they also trade other stocks related
by the same or opposite trading direction. This yields
cross–correlations of trade signs across stocks. Another
possible cause might be the order splitting, as discussed
in Sect. IVB. Of course, the way how the portfolios are
chosen might also be a reason, but we cannot support this
by empirical evidence in our study. Table IV provides a
synopsis of the comparison just carried out.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We extended the study of stock prices responses to
trading from individual stocks, i.e. self–responses, to
a whole correlated market. We empirically investigated
the price responses to the trading of different stocks, i.e.
cross–responses, as functions of the time lag. The cross–
response functions increase and then reverse back. Thus,
the impact of the trades on the prices appears to be
transient. Pictorially speaking, the market needs time
to react to the distortion of efficiency caused by the po-
tentially informed traders. In this period of distortion,
some traders, who might be interpreted as arbitrageurs,
drive the price to a reversion and thereby help to restore
market efficiency. The cross–response is clearly related to
the trade sign cross–correlations. These cross–correlators
decay in a power–law fashion, revealing a short–memory
process with exponents larger than one for a stock pair.
In our analysis, we preferred using the physical time
instead of the trading time, as the trading of different
stocks is never synchronous. We discussed the differences
occurring due to the choice of time scale. We careful
studied the accuracy of our trade sign classifications. In
much detail, we also analyzed the effects due to including
or excluding zero trade signs.
We also looked at the market as a whole by setting up a
matrix, the market response, that collects the normalized
information of all response functions. Several character-
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TABLE IV. The comparisons of self– and cross–responses
Responses self–response self–response cross–response
Scales on trading time scale on physical time scale on physical time scale
ε(t) the trade sign of t-th
trade
the aggregated trade sign at
time t
the aggregated trade sign at
time t
Rii(1) or Rij(1) the instantaneous impact the one–second impact the one–second impact
Causes of impact uninformed trades uniformed trades and in-
formed trades
uniformed trades and in-
formed trades
modes of impact change the trade price by
consuming the volumes in
the order book directly
change the trade price both
by directly consuming the
volumes in the order book
and indirectly affecting the
placement or cancellation of
limit orders
change the trade price by in-
directly affecting the place-
ment or cancellation of limit
orders or even the execution
of market orders
Properties of sign
correlations
long memory for sign
self–correlation
short memory for sign self–
correlation
short memory for sign
cross–correlation
Causes of sign cor-
relations
main: order splitting main: order splitting probable: order splitting,
herding behavior, portfolios
istic features show up which are visible in patterns hav-
ing a remarkable stability in time. The market response
provides quantitative information about how the trading
of one stock affects the prices of other stocks, and how
its own price is influenced by the trades of other stocks
stocks.
Finally, we compared the self– and the cross–responses.
The self–responses on the trading and on the physical
time scales show quite different characteristics. We found
that the self–response on the physical scale originates
from uniformed as well as from informed trades, in con-
trast to self–response on the trading scale that is only due
to uninformed trades as already shown in previous stud-
ies. Moreover, on the physical time scale, the difference of
the self– and cross–responses is striking, especially when
considering different kinds of impact.
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Appendix A: Stocks used for analyzing the market
response
We evaluated the market response for the 99 stocks
from ten economic sectors: industrials (I), health care
(HC), consumer discretionary (CD), information technol-
ogy (IT), utilities (U), financials (F), materials (M), en-
ergy (E), consumer staples (CS), and telecommunications
services (TS) as listed in Table V. The acronym AMC in
Table V stands for averaged market capitalization.
Appendix B: Error estimation
Suppose we measured or numerically simulated a set
of M data points y(τm) at positions τm, m = 1, . . . ,M .
We want to describe the data with a function f(τ) by
fitting its MP parameters. To assess the quality of the
fit, the normalized χ2 [35]
χ2 =
1
M −MP
M∑
m=1
(
f(τm)− y(τm)
)2
, (B1)
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TABLE V. Information of 99 stocks from ten economic sectors
Industrials (I) Financials (F)
Symbol Company AMC Symbol Company AMC
FLR Fluor Corp. (New) 14414.4 CME CME Group Inc. 49222.9
LMT Lockheed Martin Corp. 12857.8 GS Goldman Sachs Group 21524.3
FLS Flowserve Corporation 12670.2 ICE Intercontinental Exchange Inc. 14615.3
PCP Precision Castparts 12447.0 AVB AvalonBay Communities 11081.6
LLL L-3 Communications Holdings 12170.8 BEN Franklin Resources 10966.2
UNP Union Pacific 11920.9 BXP Boston Properties 10893.0
BNI Burlington Northern Santa Fe C 11837.5 SPG Simon Property Group Inc 10862.4
FDX FedEx Corporation 10574.7 VNO Vornado Realty Trust 10802.3
GWW Grainger (W.W.) Inc. 10416.8 PSA Public Storage 10147.9
GD General Dynamics 10035.6 MTB M&T Bank Corp. 9920.2
Health Care (HC) Materials (M)
Symbol Company AMC Symbol Company AMC
ISRG Intuitive Surgical Inc. 31355.9 X United States Steel Corp. 15937.7
BCR Bard (C.R.) Inc. 11362.7 MON Monsanto Co. 14662.6
BDX Becton Dickinson 10298.4 CF CF Industries Holdings Inc 14075.5
GENZ Genzyme Corp. 9728.8 FCX Freeport-McMoran Cp & Gld 11735.7
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 9682.6 APD Air Products & Chemicals 10246.4
LH Laboratory Corp. of America Holding 9035.7 PX Praxair Inc. 10234.5
ESRX Express Scripts 8864.6 VMC Vulcan Materials 8700.4
CELG Celgene Corp. 8783.1 ROH Rohm & Haas 8527.1
ZMH Zimmer Holdings 8681.7 NUE Nucor Corp. 7997.4
AMGN Amgen 8543.0 PPG PPG Industries 7336.7
Consumer Discretionary (CD) Energy (E)
Symbol Company AMC Symbol Company AMC
WPO Washington Post 61856.1 RIG Transocean Inc. (New) 16409.5
AZO AutoZone Inc. 14463.7 APA Apache Corp. 13981.9
SHLD Sears Holdings Corporation 11759.2 EOG EOG Resources 13095.0
WYNN Wynn Resorts Ltd. 11507.9 DVN Devon Energy Corp. 12499.7
AMZN Amazon Corp. 10939.2 HES Hess Corporation 11990.4
WHR Whirlpool Corp. 9501.9 XOM Exxon Mobil Corp. 11460.3
VFC V.F. Corp. 9051.2 SLB Schlumberger Ltd. 11241.1
APOL Apollo Group 8495.8 CVX Chevron Corp. 11100.0
NKE NIKE Inc. 8149.5 COP ConocoPhillips 10215.3
MCD McDonald’s Corp. 8025.6 OXY Occidental Petroleum 9758.4
Information Technology (IT) Consumer Staples (CS)
Symbol Company AMC Symbol Company AMC
GOOG Google Inc. 62971.6 BUD Anheuser-Busch 9780.6
MA Mastercard Inc. 28287.8 PG Procter & Gamble 9711.5
AAPL Apple Inc. 22104.1 CL Colgate-Palmolive 9549.2
IBM International Bus. Machines 15424.9 COST Costco Co. 9545.9
MSFT Microsoft Corp. 10845.1 WMT Wal-Mart Stores 9325.7
CSCO Cisco Systems 8731.4 PEP PepsiCo Inc. 9180.7
INTC Intel Corp. 8385.8 LO Lorillard Inc. 8919.0
QCOM QUALCOMM Inc. 7739.4 UST UST Inc. 8433.1
CRM Salesforce Com Inc. 7691.9 GIS General Mills 8243.3
WFR MEMC Electronic Materials 7392.8 KMB Kimberly-Clark 8069.5
Utilities (U) Telecommunications Services (TS)
Symbol Company AMC Symbol Company AMC
ETR Entergy Corp. 12798.7 T AT&T Inc. 6336.2
EXC Exelon Corp. 9738.8 VZ Verizon Communications 5732.5
CEG Constellation Energy Group 9061.5 EQ Embarq Corporation 5318.7
FE FirstEnergy Corp. 8689.4 AMT American Tower Corp. 5195.6
FPL FPL Group 7742.8 CTL Century Telephone 4333.8
SRE Sempra Energy 6940.6 S Sprint Nextel Corp. 2533.7
STR Questar Corp. 6520.4 Q Qwest Communications Int 2201.3
TEG Integrys Energy Group Inc. 5978.4 WIN Windstream Corporation 2089.1
EIX Edison Int’l 5877.5 FTR Frontier Communications 1580.9
AYE Allegheny Energy 5864.9
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FIG. 10. Cross–response noise νij(τ ) for stock different pairs
during the year 2008 versus the time lag τ measured on a
logarithmic scale. Stock pairs from the same economic sector
(top), pairs of stocks from different sectors (bottom).
is used. Here, M −MP is referred to as the number of
degrees of freedom. In our case, we have M = 1000,
MP = 3 for the fitting of trade sign cross–correlators in
stock pairs.
Appendix C: Cross–response noise
As pointed out above, the cross–response functions and
the sign cross–correlators strongly fluctuate during the
decay. Here, we address this point by introducing the
cross–response noise νij(τ) as an estimator: We deter-
mine the number T
(c)
ij common to stocks i and j in which
trading took place. We label these days with a running
integer number and separate our data into two sets, for
days with even and odd numbers, respectively. We work
out the corresponding cross–response functions R
(k)
ij (τ)
with k = 1, 2 for the averages over odd or even days.
Each of these two functions should be very close to the
cross–response function Rij(τ) averaged over all days.
Thus, we introduce a cross–response noise as some kind
of normalized Euclidian distance
νij(τ) =
1
|Rij(τ)|
√√√√1
2
2∑
k=1
(
R
(k)
ij (τ) −Rij(τ)
)2
(C1)
for each value of the time lag τ . In Fig. 10 we present
the empirical results for the cross–response noise during
the year 2008. Obvious, most stock pairs do not suffer
from large cross–response noise for time lags smaller than
about 120 seconds. During this period, the noise lies
below a value of about 0.06. With increasing time lag,
the noise becomes very strong, indicating unstable cross–
response. The largest values the noise reaches are higher
than 0.25 for lags tending towards 1000 seconds. This
is the reason why some stock pairs show upwards trends
after reversing back. As the sign cross–correlator weakens
in the regime of large time lag, other factors dominate,
leading to the large cross–response fluctuations. Limited
statistics blurs the picture, since there are only 22200
seconds of effective trading time in each trading day. This
clearly demonstrates that, when looking at the cross–
response, the lags considered must not be too large to
obtain meaningful results.
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